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ESSAY
WELFARE DEVOLUTION AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS
Helen Hershkofft
INTRODUCTION

N 1996, Congress and the President "ended welfare as we kno w it,"

eliminating Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") as
a federal entitlement and substituting instead a block grant program
that devolves responsibility to the states to design and implement
assistance programs for needy families.' The Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (the "1996 Act")
promises a major overhaul of our nation's welfare system on the theory that the states, released from federal requirements, will be more
programmatically creative, more democratically accountable, and
more fiscally responsible. 2 Whether interstate difference should decide treatment of the poor is normatively contested.' Indeed, many
* Associate Professor, New York University School of Law.
I thank Ed Baker, Yochai Benkler, Paul Chevigny, Barry Friedman, Marcel Kahan,
Lewis Kornhauser, Larry Kramer, Sylvia Law, Stephen Loffredo, Holly Maguigan,
Liam Murphy, Burt Neuborne, Richard Revesz, Larry Sager, Linda Silberman, and
Frank Upham for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Essay. I outlined some
of the ideas in this Essay at the New York University School of Law Review of Law
and Social Change Colloquium on Confronting Welfare Reform: Strategies for Advocates (Feb. 9-10, 1996) and at the Government Law Center of Albany Law School and
the Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center Symposium on State Constitutional Law: Adjudication and Reform (March 1, 1996). A version of my conference
remarks is published as Rights and Freedoms Under the State Constitution: A New
Deal for Welfare Rights, 13 Touro L. Rev. 631 (1997) [hereinafter Hershkoff, Rights
and Freedoms]. I am grateful to Dean John Sexton for encouragement, and to the
New York University School of Law Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg
Research Fund for financial support.
1. President Bill Clinton came to the White House on a campaign promise to
"end welfare as we know it." See Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long,
Stormy Journey, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1994, at Al. Although welfare includes many
important government programs, it is frequently a shorthand for AFDC, formerly
codified as Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-17 (1994). In 1993,
over 14 million people, including 9.5 million children, received AFDC benefits. See
Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., Overview of Entitlement Programs: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means 325 (Comm. Print 1994).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.) (repealing the AFDC program). See generally Helen Hershkoff & Stephen Loffredo, The Rights of the Poor 32-54 & nn.177-289, 98-105 & nnA95-537
(1997) (discussing the basic features of the 1996 Act and how they are likely to affect
state welfare programs).
3. See Charles C. Brown & Wallace E. Oates, Assistance to the Poorin a Federal
System, 32 J. Pub. Econ. 307, 327-29 (1987) (presenting a normative argument in favor
of a national, centralized approach to welfare programs).
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commentators predict that, in planning block grant programs, states

will engage in a "race to the bottom," tending to reduce welfare payments, to eliminate social services, and to block the in-migration of
indigents.4
Even before passage of the 1996 Act,5 the literature on welfare re-

form raised questions regarding legal responses should a "race to the
bottom" ensue and poor people find themselves without a meaningful
safety net. 6 Advocates for the poor have typically focused on federal
judicial strategies and national solutions.7 The efficacy of relying on

federal courts to restructure and to manage public institutions, however, has come under fire, as some critics question federal judicial capacity to resolve issues that are both polyallocational and
redistributive. 8 Moreover, although federal due process should continue to protect poor people against arbitrary governmental action
even if welfare is no longer a federal entitlement,9 the Supreme Court

4. Compare Paul E. Peterson, Devolution's Price, in Symposium Issue: Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Competition 111, 120
(Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. & Yale J. on Reg. eds., 1996) (predicting that "[s]tates will be
under great fiscal pressure to race to the bottom" in their provision of Medicaid and
income support benefits), with F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, Welfare Magnets:
The Race for the Top, 5 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 141, 141-44, 176-77 (1997) (suggesting
that the availability of federal funding allows states to externalize welfare costs and
thus engage in a race to the top). For descriptions of how some states have redesigned their assistance programs under the 1996 Act, see U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Welfare Reform: State and Local Responses to Restricting Food Stamp Benefits (1997)
(examining state and local responses to limitations imposed on the receipt of food
stamps under the 1996 Act).
5. For a description of state welfare reforms prior to 1996, see Mary Bryna
Sanger, Welfare Reform Within a Changing Context: Redefining the Terms of the Debate, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 273, 308-10 (1996) (discussing the AFDC waiver process).
6. See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, "If You Ain't Got the Do, Re, Mi": The Commerce
Clause and State Residence Restrictions on Welfare, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 147, 19099 (1993) (analyzing under the Commerce Clause "two-tier" welfare systems that cap
benefits paid to new state residents); Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefit Cases in the Block Grant Era, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 97
(1996) (discussing the availability of due process arguments under a block grant
program).
7. For accounts of federal litigation efforts to establish a federal constitutional
right to subsistence, see, for example, Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the
Welfare Rights Movement 1960-1973, at 56-145 (1993); Aryeh Neier, Only Judgment:
The Limits of Litigation in Social Change 130-40 (1982); and Barbara Sard, The Role
of the Courts in Welfare Reform, 22 Clearinghouse Rev. 367, 368-81 (1988).
8. Compare Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy 17-19 (1977) (emphasizing the judiciary's lack of institutional capacity), and Gerald N. Rosenberg, The
Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 9-36 (1981) (concluding that
courts are constrained in their abilities to generate social reform), with Malcolm M.
Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the
Courts Reformed America's Prisons 1-4 (1998) (defending the legitimacy of judicial
policy making), and R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting Welfare
Rights 23-40 (1994) (discussing the policy making role of courts in interpreting welfare statutes).
9. See Arlo Chase, Maintaining Procedural Protectionsfor Welfare Recipients:
Defining Propertyfor the Due Process Clause, 23 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 571,
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is not likely to find a federal constitutional right to income support
should state benefit payments under the 1996 Act drop below minimum subsistence levels. 10

Devolution rests on the assumption that, in a diverse nation, states

have different preferences for social welfare policies. 1 In thinking

through legal responses to devolution, we might take a cue from devolution itself and "think local." Every state has its own constitution,
supplemental to the rights of the Federal Constitution, and these documents have their own unique texts, histories, and sets of commit-

ments.' 2 To the extent that state constitutions reflect the preferences
of specific communities,' 3 they show considerable differences from
572 (1997) (contending that federal due process analysis "should incorporate the importance of the benefit at issue"); Michelle L. VanNiggeren, Comment, Erperimenting with Block Grants and Temporary Assistance: The Attempt to Transform
Welfare by Altering Federal-State Relations and Recipients' Due Process Rights, 46
Emory LJ. 1327, 1357-62 (1997) (discussing the effect of the 1996 Act on the availability of due process protections for poor people).
10. See Adam S. Cohen, More Myths of Parity: State Court Forums and Constitutional Actions for the Right to Shelter, 38 Emory LJ. 615, 633 (1989) (arguing that
since 1970, "changes in the composition of the Court ... have made the prospect [of a
federal constitutional welfare right] even more unlikely now"); Mark A. Graber, The
Clintoniflcationof American Law: Abortion, Welfar and Liberal ConstitutionalTheory, 58 Ohio St. LJ. 731, 734 (1997) (predicting that "no jurist who supports constitutional welfare rights is likely to be appointed to the Court in the near future"). More
generally, some commentators argue that because of changes in judicial appointments
and other factors, "the federal courts have become inhospitable to claims of poor
people." Matthew Diller, Poverty Lawyering in the Golden Age, 93 Mich. L Rev.
1401,1420 (1995) (reviewing Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare
Rights Movement 1960-1973 (1993)).
11. See Peter H. Schuck, Introduction Some Reflections on the Federalism Debate,
in Symposium Issue: Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and
Competition, supra note 4, at 1, 11-14 (assuming diverse regional preferences with
regard to welfare spending); Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and tie Cooperative Federalism of America's Public Income Transfer Programs,in Symposium Issue:
Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Competition, supra
note 4, at 123, 132 (contending that "state-to-state benefit level differences importantly reveal... differences in 'taste"'); cf. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money, and State
Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 847, 854 (1979) (contending that
"[d]espite the homogenizing effects of media and mobility on twentieth-century
American life, the existence of separate state and local governmental units still provides avenues for expression of the variations in style in different parts of the

country").
12. Daniel B. Rodriguez, State ConstitutionalTheory and Its Prospects,28 N.M. L
Rev. 271, 272 (1998) (observing "that state constitutions differ fundamentally from
the federal constitution in their respective histories, their political theories, and the
intra-state circumstances to which they respond.").
13. See, eg., Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalismn in Practice and Principle, 61
St. John's L. Rev. 399, 409 (1987) (referring to the "distinctive New York character"
of the New York Constitution, and characterizing it as "a product and expression of
this State"). Some commentators question whether state constitutions provide meaningful insight into the values and character of a local community. Compare Daniel J.
Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 Publius: J.
Federalism 11, 12 (1982) (contending that state constitutions reflect the characters
and values of a people), with James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourseof State Consti-
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each other and from the federal document in their approaches to social and economic issues.' 4 The Federal Constitution is typically characterized as a "charter of negative rather than positive liberties," 5
and the Supreme Court has so far declined to read the Fourteenth
Amendment as affording any "affirmative right to governmental aid,
even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or prop-

erty interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual." 6 Conversely, the constitutions of some states explicitly
create positive economic claims against the government.17 States also

operate within the generative tradition of the common law, which affects their approach to state constitutional interpretation and enhances their institutional capacity to resolve complex social and
economic matters. 8 The distinct approach that some state constitutions take toward positive rights puts into sharp relief the "New Judicial Federalism" and the extent to which states may extend rights and
liberties that are more protective than those of the Federal
Constitution.

9

tutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 761, 765 (1992) (arguing that state constitutions offer no
"conception of the character or fundamental values of the people" of a state).
14. See Louis Henkin, Economic Rights Under the United States Constitution, 32
Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 97, 122-23 (1994) (comparing positive economic rights under
federal and state constitutions).
15. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). But cf Cass R.
Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 69-71 (1993) (arguing that it is "peculiar... to say
that the Constitution does not guarantee 'affirmative rights"' in light of the Takings
Clause, property rules, and judicial enforcement of contracts).
16. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989).
But see Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2271,
2346-47 (1990) (criticizing the negative model of federal constitutional rights).
17. Positive rights, sometimes referred to as second-generation rights, refer to affirmative claims on government to meet social and economic needs. The literature
distinguishes positive from so-called negative or first-generation rights, which afford
freedom from government intrusion. See Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 110 (1978)
(stating that "[a] positive right is a claim to something ... while a negative right is a
right that something not be done to one"); see also, e.g., Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 Rutgers L.J. 881, 893-95 & nn.60-82
(1989) (reviewing state constitutional provisions affecting the poor).
18. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 20 (1995) ("[A]s is
evident in the area of state constitutional law ... state courts regularly, openly, and
legitimately speak the language of the common law whereas federal courts do not.").
19. The "New Judicial Federalism" refers to the revival of interest in state constitutions as a source of protection for individual rights. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity
and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 Va. L. Rev. 389, 389 (1998) (contending that "[s]tate courts' increased attention to state constitutions, a development
labeled the 'new judicial federalism,' represents one aspect of a broader interest in
states and state legal systems"). Earlier works on the "New Judicial Federalism" include: William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 498-503 (1977) (issuing a call for state court development of state constitutional discourse); Vern Countryman, Why a State Bill of Rights?,
45 Wash. L. Rev. 454, 470-74 (1970) (urging courts and commentators to pay increased attention to state-based liberties); David J. Fine et al., Project Report: Toward
an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 271 app. at 323-50
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Over the last generation, some state courts have considered
whether state constitutional provisions create judicially enforceable
rights to forms of social assistance, such as income support,20 reproductive health services, E" education,' and housing.3 Whether the
constitution of a particular state will be interpreted as affording an
enforceable right to subsistence-through a jobs strategy or welfare
benefits-has new significance as states tailor local, innovative approaches to social welfare policy under the 1996 Act. 24 Legal scholars
have paid little attention, however, to devolution's state constitutional
framework and to the countervailing pressures that a judicially enforceable, state-created welfare right could have on local block grant
efforts. 2 More generally, until recently, little academic attention has
been paid to state constitutional economic rights that have no immediate federal parallel. Commentators have focused instead on state constitutional provisions that are identical to those of the Federal
Constitution, urging state courts to model themselves on federal
practice. 26
(1973) (discussing the emerging importance of state constitutions for the protection of

individual liberty); Robert Force, State "Bills of Rights": A Case of Neglect and tie
Need for a Renaissance, 3 Val. U. L. Rev. 125, 162-64 (1969) (arguing in favor of
greater attention to state constitutions); and Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process"."
UnconstitutionalLaw in Oregon, 49 Or. L. Rev. 125 (1970) (emphasizing state constitutions as independent bases for judicial policy making); see also Paul A. Freund, On
Understanding the Supreme Court 116 (Greenwood Press 1977) (1949) (predicting
that "constitutional litigation over state laws will be concentrated more and more in
state courts under state constitutional provisions, and state constitutional law may
become of dominant importance").
20. See Daan Braveman, Children, Poverty and State Constitutions,38 Emory L.J.
577, 595-96 (1989) (collecting state constitutional provisions and cases relating to "the
care of the needy or the protection of the health of the people").
21. See Linda M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home: State Constitutions and Medicaid
Fundingfor Abortions, 26 N.M. L. Rev. 433, 441-45 (1996) (discussing state constitutional challenges to state statutes restricting public funding for abortion).
22. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directionsin School Finance
Reform, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 100, 185-94 (1995) (summarizing state constitutional education cases).
23. See Norma Rotunno, Note, State ConstitutionalSocial Welfare Provisions and
the Right to Housing, 1 Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp. 111, 123-27 (1996) (collecting cases
seeking to enforce a right to housing under state constitutional social welfare
provisions).
24. See David Stout, La Guardia'sLegacy: A Ditty to the Needy, Federal Welfare
Shift Spotlights Unusual Amendment to State Constitution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 8,1996,
at 41 (discussing the New York Constitution and its implications for welfare reform).
25. See Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 272-73 (contending that "the pertinence of
state constitutionalism seems unavoidable, and even urgent" in the light of devolution); see also Paul W. Kahn, State Constitutionalisin and the Problems of Fairness,30
Val. U. L. Rev. 459, 464-65 (1996) (predicting the mounting of legal challenges under
state constitutions to state welfare reforms).
26. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 13, at 770 (disparaging state constitutional practice in favor of "its far more successful cousin, American federal constitutional discourse"); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretationand Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
Harv. L. Rev. 1147, 1147 (1993) (urging state constitutionalism to draw from "American constitutionalism" in lieu of unique state sources); cf.Jennifer Friesen, State Con-
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Using state constitutional welfare rights as an example, this Essay
argues for an independent state constitutional discourse that resists
simply mapping state judicial practice onto federal doctrine. I have
explored some of these issues elsewhere. My methodology here
consists of a case study of Article XVII of the New York Constitution,
a Depression-era provision that guarantees the "aid, care and support
of the needy."' The New York Court of Appeals has interpreted Article XVII to impose "a positive duty upon the State,"2 9 but to grant

the legislature almost unreviewable "discretion in determining the
means by which this objective is to be effectuated, in determining the
amount 3of aid, and in classifying recipients and defining the term
'needy.""'

Lower courts, faced with challenges to the adequacy of

state assistance, have uncharacteristically criticized the Court of Appeals for too narrowly construing the legislature's duty to effectuate
Article XVII, as well as31the judiciary's own power to redress state
constitutional violations.
stitutional Law: Litigating Individual Rights, Claims, and Defenses § 7-5(b) (2d ed.
1996) (stating that "many state law opinions continue to depend heavily on interpretations of the federal Bill of Rights as either a point of departure or as a stopping
point"). But cf.Richard Briffault, The Item Veto in State Courts, 66 Temp. L. Rev.
1171, 1171 (1993) (criticizing the exclusive federal focus of state constitutional scholarship); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 Ga.
L. Rev. 165, 166 (1984) (urging that "the theory and methods of contemporary
Supreme Court opinions do not furnish the only proper model for decisions in the
state courts"); G. Alan Tarr, ConstitutionalTheory and State ConstitutionalInterpretation, 22 Rutgers L.J. 841, 861 (1991) (discussing the need for scholars "to reflect on
the implications of ... [state constitutional] distinctiveness for state constitutional
interpretation").
27. See Helen Hershkoff, State Constitutions and Positive Rights: The Limits of
FederalRationality Review, 112 Harv.L. Rev. (forthcoming, April 1999) (manuscript,
on file with the author).
28. N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1 (providing that "[t]he aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to
time determine"); see Hershkoff, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9-14) (discussing the
illustrative importance of the New York Constitution). As a staff attorney with the
Legal Aid Society of New York and then as an associate legal director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the author participated as counsel or as amicus curiae in
state court lawsuits involving New York constitutional claims. See, e.g., Campaign for
Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995) (involving a state constitutional challenge to state funding of public schools in New York); Asian Americans for
Equality v. Koch, 514 N.Y.S.2d 939 (App. Div. 1987) (rejecting a state constitutional
challenge to the adoption of zoning amendments creating a special district in the Chinatown neighborhood of New York City), affd, 527 N.E.2d 265 (N.Y. 1988); Thrower
v. Perales, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (preliminarily enjoining the denial of
assistance to homeless destitute persons temporarily residing in municipal shelters).
29. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451 (N.Y. 1977).
30. Id. at 452.
31. For example, McCain v. Koch, 484 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1984), affid as modified, 502 N.Y.S.2d 720 (App. Div. 1986), rev'd, 511 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1987), involved a
state constitutional challenge to the quality of emergency shelter provided to homeless and destitute families. In modifying the trial court's order preliminarily enjoining
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Other state courts, construing their state constitutional welfare pro-

visions, similarly have remitted questions about the adequacy of welfare assistance to politics, according strong deference to legislative
policy making in this area.32 Such an approach, this Essay contends,
inappropriately relies on federal practice-which conventionally views
a constitution as a source of negative restraint on legislative powerand so misapprehends the role of legislative discretion in a regime of
positive constitutional rights. 33 As applied to Article XVII, this approach also overlooks the New York provision's motivating concerns
as reflected in the state constitutional history. Parts I and II of this

Essay offer an alternative reading of Article XVII's text and history
on the view that a state constitution comprises not only a set of negative restrictions on government, but also a set of substantive commitments that government owes to its citizens. Part III presents four
themes that ought to frame discussions about the role of state constitutional welfare rights under the 1996 Act. Part IV is a brief conclusion that urges state courts to drav from unique state sources in
developing an independent and principled approach to their interpre-

tation of state constitutional welfare rights.

compliance with minimal standards of habitability and safety, the intermediate appeals court explained:
We are bound to follow the holdings of the Court of Appeals. In light of
that court's holdings ...that the adequacy of the level of welfare benefits is
a matter committed to the discretion of the Legislature, we are unable to
afford the plaintiffs complete and meaningful relief. The inability of courts
to set even minimum standards for meeting "the legitimate needs of each
recipient" .. . upon the failure of the Legislature to do so is discouraging,
saddening, and disheartening. When thousands of children are put at risk in
their physical and mental health, and subject to inevitable emotional scarring, because of the failure of City and State officials to provide emergency
shelter for them which meets minimum standards of decency and habitability, it is time for the Court of Appeals to reexamine and, hopefully, change
its prior holdings in this area. The lives and characters of the young are too
precious to be dealt with in a way justified, as argued, on the ground that the
government's efforts are more than token. They may be more than token,
but they are inadequate. On this record and on the authority [of Court of
Appeals precedent], we reluctantly conclude that Special Term erred in invoking its equitable powers to compel compliance with certain reasonable
minimal standards.
502 N.Y.S.2d at 731 (citations omitted).
32. See Hershkoff, supra note 27 (manuscript at 5-7); Sarah Ramsey & Daan
Braveman, "Let Them Starve". Government's Obligation to Children in Poverty, 68
Temp. L. Rev. 1607, 1628 (1995) (discussing the state courts' reliance on highly deferential federal standards in interpreting unique state constitutional welfare clauses).
33. Cf Jonathan Feldman, Separation of Powers and JudicialReview of Positive
Rights Claims: The Role of State Courts in an Era of Positive Government, 24 Rutgers
LJ.1057, 1075 (1993) (stating that federal doctrine "has proven a stumbling block for
a number of state courts" in enforcing positive rights).
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POSITIVE RIGHTS AND CONSTRAINED DISCRETION

The New York State Constitution, like more than a dozen other
state constitutions, explicitly recognizes the state's obligation to protect the poor against hunger and privation.3 4 The state's duty flows
from Article XVII of the 1938 Constitution, which provides that "[t]he
aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine., 35 New York's highest court first construed Article XVII in
Tucker v. Toia as establishing a judicially enforceable right to public
assistance, holding that the New York State Constitution "unequivocally prevents the Legislature from simply refusing to aid those whom
it has classified as needy. ' 36 In construing the scope of Article XVII,
the Court of Appeals has consistently held, however, that questions
about the adequacy of welfare assistance are remitted to legislative
discretion.3 7 In a broad category of cases, therefore, the court effectively treats Article XVII challenges as political questions that are beyond the power and competence of the judiciary to resolve. 38 This
part offers an alternative reading of Article XVII that treats affirmative constitutional rights as constraints on legislative discretion, on the
view that rights are not simply trumps that block government actionthey are also trumps that compel government action to achieve a prescribed end.3 9
Article XVII opens with words of command, that the legislature
provide forms of public assistance to the poor,40 and concludes with
words of permission, affording the state flexibility and open-ended authority to carry out this duty.4 1 The clauses are sequential and conjunctive, first imposing a duty on the legislature, and then empowering
the legislature to meet its duty through any chosen device. The indi34. See, e.g., Ala. Const. art. IV, § 88; Cal. Const. art. 16, §§ 3, 11, art. 34; Haw.
Const. art. IX, § 3; Idaho Const. art. X, § 1; Ill. Const. preamble; Ind. Const. art. 9,
§ 3; Kan. Const. art. 7, § 4; La. Const. art. 12, § 8; Miss. Const. art. 14, § 262; Mont.
Const. art. XII, § 3(3); Nev. Const. art. 13, § 1; N.M. Const. art. IX, § 14; N.Y. Const.
art. XVII, § 1; N.C. Const. art. XI, § 4; Tex. Const. art. XI, § 2; W. Va. Const. art. IX,
§ 2; Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 18.
35. N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
36. Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452 (N.Y. 1977).
37. See id.
38. See generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "PoliticalQuestion,"
79 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (1984-85) (explaining that "[t]he so-called 'political
question' doctrine postulates that there exist certain issues of constitutional law that
are more effectively resolved by the political branches of government").
39. This part draws on Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms, supra note *, at 640-42.
40. See N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1 ("[t]he aid, care and support of the needy...
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions").
41. See id. ("and in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from
time to time determine").
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vidual's right to assistance is thus interconnected with the government's power to effectuate that right.42
A quick reading of Article XVII might suggest that the state constitution authorizes the legislature to use public funds for welfare-making public assistance a permissible function of government-but that it
does not require the legislature to provide any such assistance. This
approach to Article XVII would render its first clause, that aid, care,
and support "shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions," dependent on, and subject to modification by, the second
clause, that aid, care and support shall be given "in such manner and
by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine."
Such a reading would effectively convert a mandatory duty of the
state into a discretionary function, leaving it to the legislature to decide whether to extend assistance and to decide the terms and conditions of relief.
From the perspective of federal constitutional jurisprudence, a discretionary reading of Article XVII has the benefit of familiarity.
Although Congress is free to create national public assistance programs, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the Federal Constitution does not mandate the provision of welfare.43 As Justice Douglas
explained in an analogous context, "[t]he Bill of Rights does not say
....

what government must give, but rather what it may not take

away."' While normatively contested,45 this view comports with the
broader idea that the power to decide social and economic policy belongs to the popular branches of government, subject only to electoral
restraint and constitutional limitation. 46 Discretion-the freedom to
make policy that the judiciary must respect-signifies that the legislature is "free to make a choice among possible courses of action or
42. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27
Ga. L. Rev. 343, 347-60 (1993) (describing the interconnection of individual rights
with government power).
43. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-86 (1970) (finding no federal

constitutional right to income support). Justifications for the Court's analysis can be
found in Robert H. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695, 699-701; Richard A. Epstein, The Uncertain Quest for
Welfare Rights, 1985 BYU L. Rev. 201, 217-19; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 117, 128 (1978); Antonio Carlos
Pereira-Menaut, Against Positive Rights, 22 Val. U. L. Rev. 359, 377-82 (1988); Ralph
K. Wimter, Jr., Changing Concepts of Equality: From Equality Before the Law to the

Welfare State, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 741, 746-55; and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Poverty,
Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, 43.

44. Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472-73 (1954).
45. Scholars put forward a range of normative arguments in favor of welfare
rights. The classic formulation remains Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword- On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 7, 19-39 (1969); see also See Hershkoff, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3

n.9) (collecting literature).
46. See Kent Greenawalt, Policy, Rights, and JudicialDecision, 11 Ga. L Rev. 991,

1004 (1977) (discussing the democratic defense of legislative policy making).
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inaction '47 and is understood to be the defining feature of legislative
power.4 8
A discretionary reading of Article XVII presents a number of interpretive difficulties. As a formal matter, the general rule is to give effect to every clause in a text.4 9 The discretionary approach fails,
however, to give effect to the clause mandating that "[t]he aid, care
and support of the needy ... shall be provided by the state and by
such of its subdivisions . . . ." Moreover, such a reading ignores linguistic distinctions between the New York State Constitution and the
Federal Constitution that ought to have interpretive salience." Article XVII has a bifurcated structure, uncommon to the Federal Constitution, but quite typical of state constitutions that afford guarantees to
government services. Such provisions often assign affirmative responsibility to the legislature and then grant broad power-frequently
without standards-to carry out the constitutional goal. The state
constitution thus commits the state to a particular public end, leaving
selection of the means for securing that end to the legislature.
An illustration from a sister state may be helpful in understanding
Article XVII's structural significance. It also highlights the considerable rhetorical differences between some state constitutional positive
rights clauses and the Fourteenth Amendment. Every state constitution in the United States provides for the establishment of a public
school system, and in some states, parents and others have challenged
the adequacy and equity of the education provided to their children
under such provisions.5 For example, the Massachusetts Constitution
declares that "[w]isdom, and knowledge.., diffused generally among
the body of the people [are] necessary for the preservation of [the
people's] rights and liberties." ' It further provides that such diffusion
"depend[s] on spreading the opportunities and advantages of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people."5 3 The education clause then mandates that "it
shall be the duty of legislators and magistrates, in all future periods of
47. Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry 4 (1969).
48. See John Bell, DiscretionaryDecision-Making: A JurisprudentialView, in The

Uses of Discretion 89, 93 (Keith Hawkins ed., 1992) (stating that "[a]lmost any definition of discretion starts with the notion of choice").
49. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("If any other
construction would render the clause inoperative, that is an additional reason for rejecting such other construction, and for adhering to their obvious meaning.").
50. Although I do not suggest that Article XVII's text provides an exclusive entry
point to its constitutional meaning, the language of a written legal document deserves
attention in legal interpretation. See Frederick Schauer, ConstitutionalInvocations, 65
Fordham L. Rev. 1295, 1296 (1997) (discussing different theoretical approaches to
"variations in textual style or degree of detail").
51. See Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the
"Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 Temp. L. Rev. 1151, 1153-66 (1995) (discussing school finance litigation from the 1970s to the present).
52. Mass. Const. Part II, ch. 5, § 2.
53. Id.
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this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially ..
public schools and
grammar schools in the towns .... "I The Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court has construed this education clause as imposing a judicially enforceable duty on the legislature to design, maintain, and support a public school system that provides the state's children with an
adequate education.5" In so holding, the court confirmed that the legislature possesses discretion to design its educational system, but underscored that the judiciary has an institutional obligation to ensure
that any such system comports with the constitutional goal of educational adequacy. 56 Numerous other state courts that have considered
the issue have rejected the argument that state educational clauses
raise a political or otherwise nonjusticiable question simply because
the legislature has discretion in operating the state's public school system. Instead, they recognize that where a state constitution man54. Id. The Massachusetts Constitution's education clause provides:
Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused generally among the
body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; and as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages
of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different
orders of the people, it shall be the duty of legislators and magistrates, in all
future periods of this Commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature
and the sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at
Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in the towns; to encourage
private societies and public institutions, rewards and immunities, for the promotion of agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, manufactures, and a
natural history of the country; to countenance and inculcate the principles of
humanity and general benevolence, public and private charity, industry and
frugality, honesty and punctuality in their dealings; sincerity, good humour,
and all social affections, and generous sentiments among the people.
Id.
55. See McDuffy v. Secretary of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 555 (Mass. 1993) (holding
"that the provisions of Part II, c. 5, § 2, of the Massachusetts Constitution impose an
enforceable duty on . . . this Commonwealth to provide education in the public
schools for the children there enrolled, whether they be rich or poor and without
regard to the fiscal capacity of the community .... ); see also Enrich, supra note 22, at
141-42 (discussing the McDuffy rationale); Alexandra Natapoff, 1993: The Year of
Living Dangerously: State Courts Expand the Right to Education, 92 Educ. L Rep.
755,767 (1994) (same). As an associate legal director of the American Civil Liberties
Union, the author participated in the McDuffy case as amicus curiae in support of
plaintiffs.
56. See McDuffy, 615 N.E.2d at 555 (setting forth guidelines defining the content
of an adequate education, and stating "we leave it to the magistrates and the Legislatures to define the precise nature of the task which they face in fulfilling their constitutional duty").
57. See e.g., Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310,318
(Wyo. 1980) (holding that a state constitutional challenge to Wyoming's financing of
public education raises "no more a political question than any other challenge to the
constitutionality of statutes"); see also Greg D. Andres, Comment, Private School
Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795, 820 (1995) ("Courts in
New Jersey, West Virginia, Texas, Kentucky, and Washington have overcome concerns of justiciable standards by interpreting the constitutional language in terms of
concrete requirements."). But see, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 658
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dates a specific government purpose, the legislature is required to use
its assigned power to achieve the prescribed end and is subject to judicial review to ensure compliance with the constitutional goal.
The presence of a positive right in a state constitution should thus
be understood as constraining the legislature's otherwise unfettered
discretion to choose from among competing policy alternatives. The
legislature can choose the means to carry out a constitutional goal, but
it cannot claim to meet its constitutional duty if the means chosen
evade, undermine, or fail to carry out the prescribed end. The relevant question is thus consequential in focus-asking whether the legislature's approach furthers or effectuates the constitutional right at
issue. 58
The force of viewing a constitution not simply as a negative restraint, but rather as a positive constraint on government may be illustrated by a pair of analogies. Consider this story. Eve says to Adam:
"Spend Thursday with me in New York. Travel here however you
like." Eve is directing Adam to rendezvous with her at a designated
time and place. He can decide how best to get to New York in time
for the Thursday meeting. But suppose Adam decides on Wednesday
that he wants to walk, and sets out that night from Boston. Arriving
two weeks later, Adam cannot really claim to have met Eve's request.
His discretion to choose how to travel is subordinate to the overall
purpose, namely, to meet Eve in New York on an appointed day.
Similarly, consider the sergeant who is ordered to select men and go
on patrol. 9 The sergeant is free to choose the men as he likes. The
sergeant's discretion does not, however, allow him to ignore the order.
Nor can he choose the men and assign them activities unrelated to
patrol-to frolic or to build a casino. And he cannot choose the men
and then fail to equip them for patrol. Even though the command to
choose men for patrol is given in open-ended terms, it contains a limit
on the sergeant's discretion that is both internal and antecedent, based
on a substantive understanding of what it means to go on patrol.
State constitutional provisions such as Article XVII follow a structure that is common to these stories. The constitutional language
commands and authorizes: it commands the legislature to meet the
needs of the poor and it authorizes the legislature to achieve the constitutional goal. In some instances, the means that the state chooses
will be instrumental to achieving the prescribed end, as, for example,
when the state provides day care for poor children to allow their parents to work outside the home. In other instances, the means will be
(Idaho 1975) (relying on the political question doctrine to bar relief in a challenge to
Idaho's public school system).
58. 1 develop this argument more fully in Hershkoff, supra note 27 (manuscript at
69-72).
59. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 31-36 (1978) (presenting the story of

a sergeant on patrol).
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constitutive of the end, as for example, when a public assistance grant
provides the cash necessary for a family's subsistence. In both instances, the legislature must use its power to effectuate a policy goal
that is constitutionally fixed. Although the right is defined in only
general terms, it creates "an environment of constraint, of... ideals to
be fulfilled" that cabins the legislature's discretion to choose only
those means that will actually carry out, or at least help to carry out,
the constitutional end.' To borrow from D. J. Galligan, a positive
constitutional right thus imposes on the legislature "a duty to reflect
upon the purposes for which powers have been conferred and to put
those purposes into practice."'"
II.

THE HISTORY OF ARTICLE

XVII

So far I have offered a textual reason for rejecting a discretionary
reading of Article XVII that would remit public assistance, like many
other social and economic matters, to the vicissitudes of politics. Article XVII's history provides further justification. For the state constitutional provision's motivating concern was to relocate the question of
welfare to the realm of rights by imposing on state government a duty
to assist the poor deemed to be "as fundamental as any responsibility
of government., 62 The New York Court of Appeals has looked to this
history to support the view that the state constitution creates a judicially enforceable obligation to provide welfare to individuals who are
categorized as needy under positive law. 63 The court has not, however, fully examined the history to make sense of Article XVII's language given the economic and ideological setting of its adoption.
Instead, the court has continued to read the text through a federal-law
prism that equates legislative discretion with unreviewable power.
This part more fully examines Article XVII's intellectual and political
history in questioning the interpretive fit between the New York
court's deferential approach and the state constitution's normative
commitment to welfare assistance. I do not claim that the state constitutional history will yield "specific answers for individual cases.'61 It
60. Philip Selznick, Law, Society, and Industrial Justice 11 (1980), quoted in Robert C. Post, The Management of Speech, Discretion and Rights, 1984 Sup. Ct. Rev.
169, 207 & n.161.
61. DJ.GaUigan, Discretionary Powers: A Legal Study of Official Discretion 17

(1986).
62. Report of the Comm. on Printing, New York State Constitutional Convention,
Revised Record 2126 (1938) [hereinafter Revised Record] (statement of Jerome D.

Barnum, Chairman).
63. See Christine Robitscher Ladd, Note, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in
New York State, 61 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 272,285-99 (1986) (presenting a history of Article
XVII and its potential use by the New York Court of Appeals in cases seeking to
establish adequate shelter for homeless families).

64. William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to
Judicial Doctrine 11 (1988). See generally Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal
Liberalism 183-84 (1996) (discussing the pros and cons of presentism); Steven G. Gey,
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does, however, provide a background understanding against which to
read the text, offering a critical perspective on the Federal Constitution's rejection of positive rights.6 5 In a more particular way, Article
XVII's history also illuminates how devolution and rights-based strategies have fared as social policy, and these successes and failures provide important lessons for courts and other decision makers.6 6
A.

Devolution and American Welfare History

Welfare in the United States is often presented as an evolution from
localist to nationalist strategies, as the "Poor Law" philosophy of the
colonial era gave way to federal supremacy in the Social Security Act
of 1935.67 In this account, the Great Depression is a watershed event,
marking the federal government's recognition that poverty is a national problem that requires federal intervention.6 s As commentators
recognize, however, the Social Security Act incorporated many of the
earlier ideological features of local relief efforts.69 In particular, the
A ConstitutionalMorphology: Text, Context, and Pretext in ConstitutionalInterpreta-

tion, 19 Ariz. St. L.J. 587, 589 (1987) (suggesting in the federal constitutional context
that originalist "values are relevant today, but they cannot settle current disputes;
they simply present the modem interpreter with a series of choices about social policies that can be drawn from the Constitution and judicially enforced").
65. Cf Lawrence Lessig, What Drives Derivability: Responses to Responding to
Imperfection, 74 Tex. L. Rev. 839, 854 (1996) (making "the claim that background
understandings constitute the meaning of a foreground text, and that one cannot understand what a text means unless one understands these background understandings
as well") (reviewing Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)); Kaye, supra note 13, at 423 (stating that "the history that has shaped the values of this State is different in many
respects from that which has shaped the consensus in other states, not to mention our
nation as a whole").
66. Cf William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American
Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1065, 1096
(1997) (suggesting that intellectual legal history can "[clontribute to contemporary
policy debates by enabling readers to assess the merits and preconditions of policies
pursued in other societies").
67. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A
Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities 147 (1985) ("The ideology of the Poor Law
firmly held that no one should receive public assistance if he was capable of supporting himself.").
68. See, e.g., Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: From the War on Poverty to
the War on Welfare (1989) (tracing the evolution of federal programs for the poor).
But see Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, The HistoricalSources of the Contemporary Relief Debate, in The Mean Season: The Attack on the Welfare State 3
(Fred L. Block et al. eds., 1987) (questioning the nationalist thesis of welfare in the
U.S.).
69. See, e.g., Michael B. Katz, In the Shadow of the Poorhouse: A Social History
of Welfare in America 242-52 (rev. ed. 1996) (recounting the ideological underpinnings of the passage of the Social Security Act); Sylvia A. Law, Women, Work, Welfare, and the Preservation of Patriarchy, 131 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1249, 1252-61 (1983)
(observing that the Social Security Act incorporated many of the ideological distinctions of the Elizabethan Poor Laws, thus limiting "federally supported welfare to the
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Social Security Act rejected the view, most forcefully presented by the
New Deal social workers, 70 that income support constitutes an essential right of social citizenship, to be extended on equal terms to all
members of a community. 71 Instead, the Social Security Act perpetuated a legal distinction between the "deserving" poor-mothers, children, the old, and infirm, all of whom were presumed to lack control
over their economic plight-and the "undeserving"-unemployables
and layabouts, seen as voluntarily adopting a life of indolence.
The nationalist story, which emphasizes federal centralization, overlooks the New Deal's most important experiment with devolution:
the federal government's decision, in 1936, to return responsibility for

general relief-assistance for so-called "unemployables"-back to the
states, following termination of the Federal Emergency Relief Administration ("FERA").72 James T. Patterson, a leading historian of this
era, reports that the reassignment of local responsibility, and the elimination of federal support for some of the "undeserving" poor, produced "desperate" conditions in much of the country, as states were
unprepared or unwilling to provide necessary assistance and services.73 New York responded to this earlier devolutionary experiment
'unemployable': the aged, blind, disabled, and women and children without men to
support them").
70. Grace Abbott, a leading social worker of the New Deal period, explained in
1939:
Unemployment may, therefore, be regarded in greater or less degree as the
inevitable result of our industrial system. Our economic life is based upon it.
A democracy which supports this system should, therefore, make adequate
and democratic provision for its victims, recognizing the costs of their care as
the price it pays for the continuance of the capitalist system.
Grace Abbott, The Social Service, A Public Responsibility, in From Relief to Social
Security: The Development of the Nev Public Welfare Services and Their Administration 3, 4-5 (1966) (adapting lectures delivered at the Los Angeles Chapter of the
American Association of Social Workers, Jan. 3-5, 1939). For a general discussion of
the welfare philosophy of the New Deal social workers, see William H. Simon, Rights
and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 Stan. L Rev. 1431, 1436-38 (1986)
[hereinafter Simon, Rights and Redistribution];and William H. Simon, The Invention
and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Md. L. Rev. 1, 4-23 (1985).
71. The term "social citizenship" comes from T.H. Marshall's influential essay,
Citizenship and Social Class. See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in Class,
Citizenship, and Social Development: Essays by T.H. Marshall 65, 71 (1964).
72. For a history of this period, see William R. Brock, Welfare, Democracy, and
the New Deal 278-325 (1988); and James T. Patterson, The New Deal and the States:
Federalism in Transition 74-101 (1969). See also Edwin Amenta & Theda Skocpol,
Redefining the New DeaL World War II and the Development of Social Provision in
the United States, in The Politics of Social Policy in the United States 81, 84 (Margaret
Weir et al. eds., 1988) (discussing federal withdrawal after 1936 from local relief
efforts).
73. Patterson, supra note 72, at 78-79. Patterson does not use the term devolution
to describe the federal government's termination of FERA. For other accounts of
this period, see Josephine Chapin Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939, at 325 (1940) (referring to events "after the liquidation of the FERA at the end of 1935" as a period of
"terror for the relief client who could not get a work relief job and who had no sure
niche in the developing categorical programs"); and Jacob Fisher, The Response of
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by expanding its commitment to the poor and by solidifying its power
to adopt social welfare legislation.7 4 In particular, the state amended

its constitution to include an explicit right to welfare, Article XVII,
which was adopted by overwhelming popular vote following the Constitutional Convention of 1938. 71
B.

Devolution and the 1938 ConstitutionalConvention

Robert M. Cover has written that "[e]ach constitutional generation

organizes itself about paradigmatic events."7 6 For the generation that

adopted Article XVII, those events were the Great Depression at
home and totalitarianism abroad.7 7 Social and economic conditions at
Social Work to the Depression 49-66 (1980) (describing federal retrenchment from
general relief efforts after enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935).
74. See Brock, supra note 72, at 311, 317-323 (reporting that New York was one of
only three states "that made stouter efforts to provide new answers to the problem of
chronic unemployment or underemployment"); Joan M. Crouse, The Homeless Transient in the Great Depression: New York State, 1929-1941, at 242 (1986) (observing
that "[a]t a time when many other states were making their laws more rigorous in an
attempt to eliminate potential relief cases, New York was actually assuming a larger
responsibility").
75. The Convention was held pursuant to a provision of the 1894 New York Constitution, requiring the voters to decide every twenty years whether a convention
should take place to amend the constitution. See N.Y. Const. of 1894 art. XIV, § 2
(renumbered art. XIX, § 2, and amended 1938). For a history of the 1938 Convention,
the second to take place in New York in the twentieth century, see Peter J. Galie,
Ordered Liberty: A Constitutional History of New York 230-261 (1996); Vernon A.
O'Rourke & Douglas W. Campbell, Constitution-Making in a Democracy: Theory
and Practice in New York State 62-247 (1943); and Frieda Almira Gillette, The New
York State Constitutional Convention of 1938 (1944) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Univ.) (on file with Cornell Univ. Library). Article XVII was part of a slate of
amendments presented for popular approval on the November 1938 ballot, and more
people voted on this amendment than for any other; it passed with the largest margin,
more than two-to-one. See O'Rourke & Campbell, supra, at 237. In 1997, the people
of New York voted against calling a state constitutional convention, See Robert F.
Williams, Ninth Annual Issue on State Constitutional Law-Introduction, 28 Rutgers
L.J. 783, 785 (1997) ("New York made preparations for its November 1997 vote, taken
every 20 years, on whether to hold a state constitutional convention. The New York
voters rejected that opportunity."); cf. Report of the Task Force on the New York State
ConstitutionalConvention, 52 Rec. Ass'n Bar City N.Y. 522, 630-31 (1997) (opposing
any constitutional amendment to limit or to restrict the mandatory obligation of existing social welfare provisions).
76. Robert M. Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protectionof Minorities, 91 Yale L.J. 1287, 1316 (1982); see Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 4 (1983) (stating that
"[n]o set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that
locate it and give it meaning. For every constitution there is an epic. . . ."); see also
Patrick Baude, Interstate Dialogue in State ConstitutionalLaw, 28 Rutgers L.J. 835,
836 (1997) (arguing "that there are meaningful local epics" that are important to state
constitutional interpretation).
77. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Crisis of Democratic Theory: Scientific Naturalism and the Problem of Value 117-38 (1973) (discussing the influence of totalitarianism and economic upheaval on American thinking in the 1930s). The opening
speech at the 1938 Convention, by Edward J. Flynn, Secretary of State, urged: "You
are assembled during a most critical time in the world's history, when new forms of
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the time of the New York Constitutional Convention of 1938 gave
shape and content to the delegates' constitutional concerns. 78 In an
important sense, the Convention and subsequent popular vote focused
attention on what Frank I. Michelman has termed "demoralization
costs"-the potentially destructive reaction of individuals to legal orders that fail to respond to normative claims of need.7 9 In the fouryear period beginning in 1929, industrial jobs dropped from over one
million to little more than 700,000, with a corresponding dip in wages.
Unemployment was pervasive. By 1933, more than one and a half
million New Yorkers were receiving some kind of assistance and many
more needed relief but went unaided.' 0 As Harry Hopkins put it, in a
speech to the National Council of Social Work that year, "[W]e are
now dealing with all classes.... It is no longer a matter of unemployable and chronic dependents, but your friends and mine."8 "
government are being created throughout the world and democratic principles are
being forgotten." O'Rourke & Campbell, supra note 75, at 1. This section draws on
Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms, supra note *,at 64247.
78. For a general history of social and economic conditions in New York during
this period, see William W. Bremer, Depression Winters: New York Social Workers
and the New Deal (1984); Brown, supra note 73; Crouse, supra note 74; Robert P.
Ingalls, Herbert H. Lehman and New York's Little New Deal (1975); John D. Millett,
The Works Progress Administration in New York City (1938): and David M. Schneider & Albert Deutsch, The History of Public Welfare in New York State: 1867-1940,
at 293-375 (Patterson Smith 1969).
79. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1214 (1967) (defining demoralization costs).
80. See Crouse, supra note 74, at 53 (stating that "industrial employment fell from
1,105,963 to 733,457 and wages from $1,650,389,000 to $754,367,000"). The number of
homeless men seeking temporary shelter in the Buffalo municipal lodging house increased during these years by over 1000%, to over 750,000. See id.at 69. Similarly,
the rate of malnutrition per 1000 children under age six in the Mulberry district in
New York City increased from 60.3 to 99. See Grace Abbott, Children and the Depression: A NationalStudy and Warning, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1932, at 5. The City Health
Department further reported an increase in malnutrition among students, from 13.4%
in 1929 to 20.5% in 1932. See id. "Teachers remarked that many young children
seemed dazed and distracted in school, as though old before their time. They were
undernourished." Stout, supra note 24, at 41.
81. Katz, supra note 69, at 219 (quoting Harry Hopkins). Commentators increasingly saw poverty as evidence of "abnormal social phenomena," the consequence of
economic structures and market forces that were largely beyond the control of any
individual or family. See, e.g., John Lewis Gillin, Poverty and Dependency. Their Relief and Prevention 5 (3d ed. 1937) (discussing how the "abnormal social phenomenon" of poverty and dependency can illustrate the nature and function of a normal
society). Nevertheless, the federal government, under President Hoover's leadership,
persisted in refusing to extend assistance. In New York, by contrast, then-Governor
Franklin Delano Roosevelt called on the "responsibility" of "every civilized nation"
to "car[e] for those of its citizens who find themselves the victims of such adverse
circumstance as makes them unable to obtain even the necessities for mere existence
without the aid of others." Brown, supra note 73, at 89. FDR declared:
While it is true that we have hitherto principally considered those who
through accident or old age were permanently incapacitated, the same responsibility of the State undoubtedly applies when widespread economic
conditions render large numbers of men and women incapable of supporting
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As Governor, Herbert Lehman carried forward President
Roosevelt's earlier progressive initiatives, and in 1934 convened a
Commission on Unemployment Relief (the "Relief Commission") to
study and help reform the state's social welfare programs. The Relief
Commission's first report, issued in 1936, coincided with the national
government's controversial decision to dismantle the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and to return responsibility for general
relief back to the states.82 Without matching federal funds, many
states in this period refused or were unable to continue assistance programs for indigents who did not meet the categoric requirements of
federal programs, which were largely designed for unemployed workers and mothers.8 3 The Relief Commission's report, by contrast,
urged New York to maintain its high level of commitment in meeting
the needs of all of the state's poor.' Recognizing the problem of
"unemployables" as a permanent social issue, and not a temporary
concern of the Depression, the Relief Commission stressed the need
to develop long-term capacity to sustain "a continuing and permanent
policy for home relief."8 5 The state's "little New Deal" went forward,
and in January 1938, Governor Lehman publicly reaffirmed the state's
duty to the poor: "government must adhere to the policy of assuring
either themselves or their families because of circumstances beyond their
control which make it impossible for them to find remunerative labor. To
these unfortunate citizens aid must be extended by government-not as a
matter of charity but as a matter of social duty.
Id. at 89-90; see also Bremer, supra note 78, at 57 (quoting FDR's proclamation of
January 1932 that responsibility for the Depression is of "a complex and impersonal
nature" and "will not be lodged at the door of those who need help today").
82. Edith Abbott, an important member of the social work community, responded
to announcements of FERA's proposed dismantlement with an article in the Nation
entitled, "Don't do it Mr. Hopkins!":
All who have recognized the miserable incompetence of the old system
know that returning to local relief authorities means returning to everything
that is reactionary in the field of social welfare .... [L]ocal politicians temporarily banished by the resolute orders of the Federal Relief Administration, will return to the welfare controls.
Brock, supra note 72, at 251.
83. See id. at 297. As William R. Brock has chronicled:
In the eighteen months after the last FERA grant, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi, and South Dakota withdrew completely from general relief and returned exclusive responsibility to their local governments. Florida, Georgia,
Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina,
and Vermont voted no funds for general relief but gave some assistance for
relief administration. New Jersey and Missouri withdrew completely from
general relief, but later had second thoughts and set up state agencies with
limited regulatory power.
Id.; see also Fisher, supra note 73, at 62 (reporting that "[h]undreds of thousands of
families suffered a reduction in income, in some places were cut off from assistance
altogether when federal funds ran out").
84. By way of comparison, in 1934, the average monthly assistance payment per
family in New York was $45.12; it was less than $15 in 12 states, including Connecticut, and an average of $23.90 nationally. See Patterson, supra note 72, at 54-55.
85. See Brock, supra note 72, at 319-20 (quoting the Relief Commission's report).
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The Commis-

sioner of Social Welfare, David C. Adie, wrote that same year: "One
of the great tasks of our expanding democracy is to fix minimum stan-

dards of physical and cultural existence beneath which no person shall
be allowed to fall-barring disasters beyond human control."'
At the 1938 Constitutional Convention, responsibility for crafting
the terms of the welfare right was assigned to the Convention's Committee on Social Welfare (the "Welfare Committee"), chaired by Edward Corsi, a liberal Republican from New York City. With New
York already in the forefront of social welfare policy, the Welfare
Committee had two goals. The first goal was to constitutionalize state
responsibility for the poor, making it a governmental mandate and not
simply a discretionary function. The second goal was to ensure state
administrative capacity to carry out this duty.' s Welfare Committee
members specifically denounced the failure of other states to meet the
needs of the poor in this period, referring, for example, to the "brutal
callousness to human suffering ... witnessed... in the State of New
Jersey" when the State Relief Council closed in 1936 following
FERA's demise.8 9

The Welfare Committee held two public hearings before sending a
version of the Chair's proposal to the floor of the Convention, identi86. Herbert H. Lehman, Annual Message to the Legislature (1938), reprinted in
Public Papers of Herbert H. Lehman: Forty-Ninth Governor of the State of New
York Third Term 1938, at 39 (1942).
87. David C. Adie, Foreword to David M. Schneider, The History of Public Welfare in New York State 1609-1866 at ix, xii (1938); see Ingalls, supra note 78, at 49-50
(describing Adie as "an early champion of the 'new philosophy of collective responsibility'); cf. James T. Patterson, America's Struggle Against Poverty 44 (1981) (reporting 1934 statement of Harry Lurie, Chairman of the American Association of
Social Workers subcommittee on Federal Action, calling for the "establishment of
minimum standards of security applying to the entire population").
88. Prior to the Convention, Senator Robert F. Wagner, in a speech in Rochester,
called for a seven-point program that would place "beyond doubt" and declare in
"unmistakable terms" the power and duty of the legislature to enact and finance public welfare laws. O'Rourke & Campbell, supra note 75, at 70; see also id. at 96 n.3 &
161 (stating that "[t]he final objective was to place in the constitution safeguards anticipating possible judicial decisions which would nullify rights such groups now possessed or which might be conferred upon them in the future by a favorable
legislature"); Brock, supra note 72, at 349-50 (discussing the constitutional goals of
social welfare measures).
89. See All State Relief Ends in Jersey; Local Areas Must Feed 270,000, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 17, 1936, at Al. As one social worker commented:
A return to predepression conditions means the unnecessary death of
thousands of mothers each year and invalidism for many-a very great
many-others; it means inadequate treatment for sick children and for crippled children; it means wholly inadequate resources for the education of parents, through child health centers, in the scientific care of their children; it
means that the supervision of the health of most school children will not be
provided.
Abbott, supra note 70, at 194-95.
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cal in language to the present text of Article XVII.9 0 During the floor
debate, Chairman Corsi explained:
Here are words which set forth a definite policy of government, a
concrete social obligation which no court may ever misread. By this
section, the committee hopes to achieve two purposes: First: to remove from the area of constitutional doubt the responsibility of the
State to those who must look to society for the bare necessities of
life; and, secondly, to set down explicitly in our basic law a much
needed definition
of the relationship of the people to their
91
government.

Mr. Corsi explained to the delegates that Article XVII was presented
as "a charter of human protection for the underprivileged, the destitute and the handicapped of our State."' In an important sense, the
amendment solidified a "constitutional moment" as part of the state's3
primary law, explicitly changing the state's obligation to its citizens.1
As Senator Robert F. Wagner explained on the floor of the 1938 Convention, the constitutional goal was to meet "the threat to freedom
that comes . . . from poverty and insecurity, from sickness and the
slum, from social and economic conditions in which human beings
cannot be free." 94
C. Motivating Purpose
Article XVII's history suggests that the provision has two closely
related aims. The first is conceptual and at the level of constitutional
purpose: to provide a normative sense of what politics ought to entail
by making concern for material well being an essential piece of the
state's duty to its members. The second is strategic and at the level of
administrative structure: to afford the state plenary power to carry
out its mandatory duty to assist the poor. Article XVII achieved these
two purposes by imposing on state government an enforceable duty to
meet the needs of the poor, while granting the legislature open-ended
authority to achieve that goal. As explained at the Convention: "The
Legislature['s] ...hands are untied. What it may not do is... shirk its
responsibility which, in the opinion of the committee, is as fundamental as any responsibility of government." 95
90. The Welfare Committee considered and rejected a number of proposals before
agreeing to send language to the floor. See Ladd, supra note 63, at 289-91 (analyzing
proposed language).
91. Revised Record, supra note 62, at 2126 (statement of Mr. Corsi).
92. Id. at 2125.
93. See 1 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6 (1991) (developing the
theory of constitutional moments); cf S. Rep. No. 104-96, at 65 (1995) ("It is indeed a
constitutional moment." (quoting Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, referring to an early
version of the bill that became the 1996 Act)).
94. O'Rourke & Campbell, supra note 75, at 117.
95. Revised Record, supra note 62, at 2126 (statement of Mr. Corsi).
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Creation of a right to welfare reflected a complete rejection of
Lochner's premise that regulatory intervention to achieve social welfare goals is an unconstitutional interference with a preexisting com-

mon law distribution of rights and property.96 The common law

imposes no duty on individuals to assist others who are in distress; by

analogy, government has no obligation to assist citizens facing economic trouble.97 Measured against this common law baseline, government action on behalf of the poor is suspect, for it interferes with a
"natural" distribution of obligations and benefits. At the time of the
Convention, some analysts thus viewed social legislation on behalf of
the poor as outside the realm of general legislation and not an appropriate use of governmental funds.9 8 Article XVII challenged these

background understandings. Henceforth, government inaction in the
face of poverty would require justification. 99 As Mr. Corsi explained

on the Convention floor: "What we ask is that such constitutional
doubts as exist be removed and the State's obligation be recognized
definitely and specifically."'" 0

Article XVII thus transformed welfare from an expedient policy
choice to a mandatory feature of the social structure. The New York
Social Services Law of 1929 had authorized the provision of welfare,
but only "as far as possible" and "in so far as funds are available." '
Welfare was instead a discretionary function, located in the world of
96. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); see Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's
Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873, 874 (1987) (discussing the idea of government neutrality in the pre-New Deal period).
97. See Barbara E. Armacost, Affirmative Duties, Systemic Harms, and the Due
Process Clause, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 982, 985 (1996) (observing that just as federal courts
are "reluctant to hold the government liable for failures to protect ... there is a whole
universe of ordinary tort cases virtually identical to the cases that have been brought
under the Due Process Clause"); Peter F. Lake, Recognizing the Importance of Remoteness to the Duty to Rescue, 46 DePaul L. Rev. 315, 316 (1997) ("[I1t is commonly
understood that there is no general, nonstatutory duty to rescue another in peril, not
even a minimal duty that could be discharged by a riskless warning, absent a special
relationship." (citations omitted)).
98. See Howard Gillmann, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of
Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence (1993) (examining the idea of "class legislation" during the Lochner era); G. Edward White, Revisiting Substantive Due Process
and Holmes's Lochner Dissent, 63 Brook. L. Rev. 87, 91-97 (1997) (discussing the
anti-class principle and its implications for social legislation during the Lochner era).
99. Cf. Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort: Deshaney and Its Aftermath, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 107, 158-59, 165-67 (1991)
(discussing the role of government inaction in federal positive rights analysis); William E. Nelson, The Changing Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 3, 8-10 (1995) (describing the evolution of New
York police power cases dealing with redistributive legislation).
100. Revised Record, supra note 62, at 2142 (statement of Mr. Corsi); see 6 New
York State Const. Convention Comm., Problems Relating to Bill of Rights and General Welfare 482 (1938) (describing constitutional problems of social assistance).
101. See Crouse, supra note 74, at 43; Schneider & Deutsch, supra note 78, at 286-
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local party patronage. 0 2 Amending the state constitution and providing that "[t]he aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns
and shall be provided by the state"' 1 3 ensured that government relief
for the poor would no longer be contingent or contested. Article
XVII also rejected the earlier Poor Law ideology that associates poverty with personal fault and places responsibility for the poor on the
family and local units. 10 4 Under the Poor Laws, localities extended
relief to the poor in a humiliating fashion and only "to keep the person alive."' 1 5 The rejection of this philosophy, according to a contemporary social worker, meant that relief was henceforth to "be
adequate" and not given "to pauperize.' 0 6 As a member of the Welfare Committee explained, "[W]e feel that up to that very last penny
where somebody needs help to eat and to have shelter and to preserve
body and soul, there is a claim on the state."'0 7 Other members of the
Welfare Committee repeated this view: "They have to eat, they have
102. For a discussion of the relation between local party patronage and the provision of poor relief in New York before 1938, see Leah Hannah Feder, Unemployment
Relief in Periods of Depression 185-88 (1936) (discussing political party involvement
in the administration of poor relief). See generally Ann Shola Orloff, The Political
Origins of America's Belated Welfare State, in The Politics of Social Policy in the
United States 37, 49-51 (Margaret Weir et al. eds., 1988) (discussing problems of patronage in a democracy); Theda Skocpol & John Ikenberry, The PoliticalFormationof
the American Welfare State in Historicaland Comparative Perspective, 6 Comp. Soc.
Res. 87, 92-93 (1983) (discussing the relation between "patronage democracy and distributive social benefits").
103. N.Y. Const. art. XVII, § 1.
104. During the colonial period, for example, New York provided relief to the
poor, but required recipients to wear badges with "the letters 'N.Y.' on their clothes"
as a sign of public shame. Lester M. Salamon, Welfare: The Elusive Consensus:
Where We Are, How We Got There, and What's Ahead 67 (1978). Briefing papers
prepared for the Convention explicitly rejected the poor-law mentality that motivated
earlier relief efforts: "All past relief experience had been based on pauper-poor-law
philosophy, with its accent on private generosity and public scorn. But when unemployment lost its former aspect of individual blameworthiness, and took on the color
of public calamity, the old poor-law methods became entirely inapplicable." 4 New
York State Const. Convention Comm., State and Local Government in New York 430
(1938); cf Edith Abbott, Abolish the Pauper Laws, 8 Soc. Serv. Rev. 1 (1934) (urging
the states to revise the old poor laws, "not merely because the exigencies of the depression have led to a new concern about poor relief administration but because the
so-called 'emergency' relief organizations must, in the not distant future, be supplanted by some continuing machinery vastly superior to the old local poor relief
administration").
105. See Gillin, supra note 81, at 206.
106. Id. As the Chair of the Welfare Committee explained to the delegates:
Unemployment, we have learned after nine years of depression and recession, is not a transitory phenomenon and the kind of prosperity that will put
all the unemployed back to work is not around the corner.
Unemployment is inherent in our industrial system. It is a natural concomitant of our technological progress. It is a permanent problem which
must be met with all the vision and all the courage at our command.
Revised Record, supra note 62, at 2143-44 (discussing a proposed wage and hours
amendment to the state constitution).
107. Revised Record, supra note 62, at 2147.
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to live, they have to have shelter, and you and I will never rest comfortably, as well off as we may be, unless these people have the neces-

sities of life."' 0
Article XVII's second purpose is related to the first. Having created a new constitutional duty to provide assistance to the poor, the
New York Constitution now ensured that the state has authority to
carry out this mandate. Like many state constitutions of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the New York Constitution imposed fiscal limits on the state's use of public money for direct
relief.'0 9 The state could not use public credit to provide assistance
directly to individuals," 0 and local governmental units operated under
similar restraints."' New York City, for example, was prohibited
under its municipal charter from using public money for outdoor work
relief." 2 Article XVII lifted these spending restrictions and clarified

that state expenditures on behalf of the poor are a public purpose to

be supported by tax and other sources of revenue.
D. The Uses of History
The New York Court of Appeals has looked to history in recognizing a judicially enforceable right to welfare under the state constitution. 3 It has failed, however, to consider fully the broader
intellectual context of Article XVII's adoption and its implications for
welfare rights. Many commentators have described the New Deal as a
108. Id.at 2172.
109. See Simeon E. Baldwin, Modem Political Institutions 73-74 (1898) (discussing
state constitutional limits on state aid and debt); Carl A. Heisterman, Constitutional
Limitations Affecting State and Local Relief Funds,6 Soc. Serv. Rev. 1 (1932) (collecting state constitutional restrictions on poor relief in several states); cf James Willard
Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 31 (1950) (stating that "[the
most significant formal limits put on the state legislatures related to the power of the
purse: i.e., the limitations, or the total prohibition, set upon state debt, on the lending
of state credit or other subsidies to private enterprise; and the limits put on local
government finance"); Stephen Guardbaum, New Deal Constitationalismand the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 483, 487 (1997) (observing the "specific
constitutional constraints on the power of states that had either been imposed for the
first time or substantially enhanced during the Lochner era").
110. These spending limits explain, in part, the administrative structure of the Temporary Emergency Relief Administration ("TERA"), in which state funds were channeled to localities for public assistance, rather than used for direct relief. See Brown,
supra note 73, at 90 (describing funding mechanisms under TERA).
111. See Edward S. Corwin, The Extension of JudicialReview in New York, 17831905,15 Mich. L. Rev. 281,299 (1917) (noting that the New York Constitution prohibited "gratuities by local government").
112. See Brown, supra note 73, at 7 n.12 (discussing the judicial invalidation of outdoor relief in Brooklyn in 1879, and stating that "[t]he very fact that this could happen
shows the unsubstantial nature of the foundation upon which the system of poor relief
rests"); Feder, supra note 102, at 186-88 (citing legal difficulties surrounding New
York City bond measures designed for poor relief in the period 1893-97); Schneider &
Deutsch, supra note 78, at 299 (noting that "the situation was complicated" in New
York City due to this clause).
113. See Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d 449, 451-52 (N.Y. 1977).

1426

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

period of great plasticity and experimentation, when those involved in
forging the new regulatory order spoke of the "ideal state . . . as a

process of becoming.' 1 14 Just as the general welfare was recognized
no longer to be "static," but rather "chang[ing] with the times,"1 15 so
government powers assumed an expansive flexibility to deal with an
enlarged sense of public purpose. Broad authorizing statutes became
standard,' 16 leaving the means of implementation
to the government
1 7
to choose subject to meaningful judicial review.

In the face of federal retrenchment from a non-categorical approach to poor relief, Article XVII constitutionalized the New Deal

spirit by creating a state duty to assist the poor and assigning the legislature discretion to carry out the constitutional goal. The language
chosen-"in such manner and by such means"-was meant to overcome specific constitutional problems that had developed in earlier
years when the state constitution attempted to broaden the scope of

legislative action but did so by enumerating specific powers, which
then became restraints on government capacity as new situations developed." 8 The 1938 delegates thus adopted language intended both
to mandate and to empower, making government provision of welfare
114. Mark Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol,
and Workplace Cooperation, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1381, 1413 (1993) (quoting Robert
Wagner, The Ideal Industrial State, N.Y. Times, May 9, 1937 (Magazine), at 8). Many
historians have noted the "experimental" atmosphere of the New Deal period. See,
e.g., Crouse, supra note 74, at 53 (stating that FDR "recognized the need for experimentation, change, and immediate action"); Susan Ware, Beyond Suffrage: Women
in the New Deal 6 (1981) (describing the "experimental, reformist atmosphere of the
New Deal"); Simon, Rights and Redistribution, supra note 70, at 1447-49 (describing
FERA as "daring, experimental, redistributive, and disrespectful of the lines that separated workers from nonworkers").
115. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641 (1937).
116. See Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: Ideology, Policy, and the Crisis
of Public Authority 132-33 (1969); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 247, 255 (1996) (stating that New
Deal enactments were marked by "open-ended delegations of authority"). But cf.
Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 5 (1982) (explaining that
"unlike earlier codifications of law, which were so general that common law courts
could continue to act pretty much as they always had, the new breed of statutes [in the
post-New Deal period] were specific, detailed, and 'well drafted' (quoting Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 96 (1977))).
117. See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (stating
that judicial acquiescence in legislative delegations of power to administrative agencies is "a reflection of the necessities of modem legislation dealing with complex economic and social problems"); Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 746 (D.D.C. 1971) (allowing
administrative delegation subject to review by Congress, the courts, and the public).
See generally Merrick B. Garland, Deregulationand JudicialReview, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
505, 510-12 (1985) (discussing trends in judicial review of administrative action).
118. Cf Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw Processes,24 Win. & Mary L.
Rev. 169, 202 (1983) (connecting popular distrust of state legislatures with "the insertion of specific 'constitutional legislation' into state constitutional texts, thereby
supplanting legislative prerogatives" (citations omitted)). As early as 1920, a commentator explained this general trend in state constitutionalism:
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assistance a constitutional duty, with the legislature accountable both

to the courts and to the people. 119 The amendment responded to one

of the major criticisms of the state constitution then in force: that its
specific elaboration of legislative powers confined the state, depriving

it of the flexibility which it needed to adapt to changing circumstances.12 The amendment used an open-ended phrase--"in such
manner and by such means"-to make clear that the state has broad
power to meet the needs of the poor.

The state constitutional history of welfare rights in New York illustrates how a particular state may choose to define the scope of its
public obligations in ways that cut against the grain of federal convention.' 2 ' Federal Constitutional scholars tend to rely on originalist arguments to oppose the judicial recognition of welfare rights;122 more
generally, federal constitutional scholarship's "turn to history" is said
to ratify existing practice by mooring legislative decisions to the deciConstructions of state constitutions have in the main been restrictive of legislative power. They have been primarily responsible for the insertion into
state constitutions within recent years of a large mass of social and labor
legislation; but provisions inserted in a constitution in order to relieve from
the operation of previous decisions become themselves in turn subject to a
restrictive interpretation.
W. F. Dodd, The Problem of State Constitutional Construction,20 Colum. L Rev. 635,
647 (1920); cf. Lawrence Schlam, State ConstitutionalAmending, Independent Interpretation,and PoliticalCulture.: A Case Study in ConstitutionalStagnation, 43 DePaul
L. Rev. 269, 282 (1994) (stating that "many legislatively initiated amendments might
have been necessary to reverse the deleterious effects of earlier judicial opinions interpreting constitutional or statutory provisions" (citations omitted)).
119. See Galie, supra note 75, at 238 ("Article XVII established an affirmative social right which any individual may demand from the government. It required the
state to assume a major role in the field of social welfare."). Similarly, William R.
Brock reports, "Thus New York wrote into its constitution a new concept of public
responsibility for welfare and swept away restraints on actions intended to relieve the
distress, safeguard the health, and improve the quality of life of the poorest people in
society." Brock, supra note 72, at 350.
120. See Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Lawmaking by PopularVote." Some Reflections
on the New York Constitution of 1938, 24 Cornell L.Q. 1, 1-5 (1938) (stating that the
Convention of 1938 sought to provide the state legislature with broad flexibility to
deal with social problems).
121. Cf. Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of JudicialReview: A Pleafor New Contexts,
49 Stan. L. Rev. 1031, 1031 (1997) (explaining that "critical history appeals to those
who seek to rescue lost voices of the past from the hegemonic claims of the victors
whose triumphs the discipline of history has often served and promoted").
122. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 864, 865-66 (1986) (arguing that "[tihe Framers would have been astounded to hear it contended that by adopting the Bill of Rights they had managed to
make mandatory the exercise of a Congressional power to help needy citizens .... ").
But cf. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and tie
Role of the State in the FramingEra,20 Hastings Const. L.Q. 267, 277 (1993) (presenting an originalist argument that "[i]n the framing generation, governments were expected to furnish disease prevention programs and provisions to secure the public
health because the Framers believed that governmental authority was tied to the protection of health and safety").
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sions of a by-gone generation. 123 There is a different history, however, that attaches to most state constitutions. In some states, these
histories capture the changed social contract between government and
its people that came into being in the twentieth century and that resonates with modem constitutions around the world. 124 By conforming

state constitutionalism to federal practice, courts and commentators
suppress these competing state narratives that thread through our nation's story, thus foreclosing "a space for freedom and innovation, not
in the escape from history, but'1 in
choosing which traditions and trajec25
tories to attach ourselves to.'
III.

STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND WELFARE REFORM

Underlying devolution is the assumption that the states will construct a set of social policies to reflect their residents' unique preferences, viewing public assistance as one among a number of social
services that voters might want to provide.'2 6 Article XVII, and state
constitutions of which it is illustrative, stems from a different theory of
democracy, pointing to a thicker conception of political life that contrasts sharply with the negative-rights model of the Federal Constitution.'2 7 Under these state constitutions, public assistance programs do
not involve a "taste" for welfare, instead of, say, for public tennis
123. See Michael C. Doff, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Foreword: The Limits
of Socratic Deliberation, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10 n.23 (1998) ("characterizing originalism ... as backward-looking [but] ... not deny[ing] that originalist arguments are
often invoked as a means of breaking with established precedent"). But see Robert W.
Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 Yale L.J. 1017, 1024 (1981) (recognizing
that although "legal history has on the whole served to bolster and reassure existing
enterprises of legal scholarship ... historicist criticism is always ultimately destabilizing to the enterprise").
124. Cf.Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism,83 Va. L. Rev. 771,
773 (1997) (observing that "[t]he standard [U.S.] judge or lawyer would hardly raise
an eyebrow when told, for example, that existing American law on ...welfare rights
offends basic constitutional principles as the rest of the civilized world has come to
understand them"); Nelson, supra note 99, at 6 (contending that "the current wisdom
loses sight of a vibrant body of New York law that emerged in the middle of the
twentieth century and contributed significantly to some people's attainment of their
goal of equality, even while refusing to grant them a right to equality").
125. Robert W. Gordon, The Struggle Over the Past, 44 Clev. St. L. Rev. 123, 142
(1996); cf. Herman Belz, History, Theory, and the Constitution, 11 Const. Commentary 45, 55 (1994) (stating Robert Gordon's contention that "history in general liberates the political imagination by revealing suppressed alternatives").
126. Cf. Daphna Lewison-Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and
the Provision of Public Goods, 108 Yale L.J. 377, 380 (1998) (distinguishing between
consumer and voter preferences).
127. Cf Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad
16-17 (1994) (distinguishing between "minimal morality" and "thickly conceived values"); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 410 (1993) (discussing the thinness of federal
constitutional law). But cf. James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, In Search of a
Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509, 519-20 (1997) (reviewing Michael J. Sandel,
Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (1996), and Cass
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courts or for a municipal opera. They are, instead, constitutive of a
basic duty that the state owes to its citizens, requiring government-as
was expressed at the 1938 Convention-to protect its members from
"the threat to freedom that comes .. from poverty and insecurity,
from sickness and the slum, from social and economic conditions in
which human beings cannot be free."'" To borrow from Jeremy Waldron, constitutional clauses such as Article XVII make the provision
of assistance to the poor not simply a "contingency of public policy,
..something that might be changed or abolished whenever the administration changes its political hue," but rather an aspect of "social
citizenship.' 2 9
The federal government's current approach to welfare reform
grants the states broad authority to develop new assistance programs
for the poor. As devolution takes shape at the local level, state legislators need to consider whether their state constitution imposes any
independent obligation on them to deal meaningfully with the
problems of poverty. State constitutions, of course, differ in their detail and emphasis. Nevertheless, state constitutional welfare provisions share many structural similarities that allow for general
reflections on how they can and should influence future reforms under
the 1996 Act. This section suggests four broad themes that should
frame future discussion of state constitutions as welfare devolution
moves forward.
First, state constitutional welfare provisions such as Article XVII
establish a principle of government duty to assist the poor. A criticism
of this view would posit that a state constitutional welfare right is inconsistent with the 1996 Act, which purports to eliminate any federal
entitlement to welfare. Commentators emphasize, however, that entitlements do not conflict with the goals of block grant programs; they
are, instead, "mutually reinforcing, not oppositional, categories.""'
Respecting a state constitutional welfare right would in fact reinforce
one of the major purposes of the 1996 Act-to enhance state latitude
over welfare by encouraging the development of social and economic
programs that reflect self-conscious political choices rooted in local
R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996)) (discussing the place of
welfare rights in thick and thin conceptions of federal constitutionalism).
128. O'Rourke & Campbell, supra note 75, at 117 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
129. Jeremy Waldron, Social Citizenship and the Defense of Welfare Provision, in

Liberal Rights: Collected Papers 1981-1991, at 271, 273 (1993); see also, David Firestone, Clinton to Sign Welfare Bill that Ends U.S. Aid Guarantee and Gives States
Broad Power, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1996, at Al (stating that the New York Constitu-

tion obligates "the state and city ... to make up [the] difference" to people once
AFDC is repealed (quoting Mayor Giuliani of New York City)).
130. Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants, Entitlements, and Federalisnv A Conceptual Map of Contested Terrain, in Symposium Issue: Constructing a

New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Competition, supra note 4, at 279,
302.
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experience. Nor would a state constitutional welfare right deprive
state legislators of discretion to develop welfare policy.' 3 ' A state legislature retains authority to experiment and to innovate-constrained
only by the constitutional goal that public assistance programs actually
132
assist the poor, and not punish the poor for their economic distress.
Second, state constitutional welfare provisions establish a principle
of state responsibility for meeting the needs of the poor, curtailing
devolution's assumption that subsidiary units are best placed to make
decisions about social welfare programs. Subsidiary units are often
smaller units, and are believed to have a greater structural capacity to
protect human rights and to encourage participation values. 133 Small

communities do not, however, always protect minority civil rights, 34
they do not always produce greater opportunities for citizen participation, 35 and they do not always have the resources to carry out the
social welfare preferences of their members. 1 36 As Paul E. Peterson

has observed, localities rarely define their community purposes as
"the enhancement of the material well-being of workers, the poor, or

minorities."' 137 Given interregional variances in wealth, race, and capacity, 13 as well as the greater likelihood of special interest capture of

131. Cf. William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered as a Matter of State ConstitutionalLaw, 16 Harv.
J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 303, 307 (1993) (questioning whether the federal government may
abridge state constitutional rights by placing conditions upon the receipt of federal
funds).
132. Cf.Robert E. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State 184-233 (1988) (discussing the relation between welfare rights and government discretion to withhold assistance).
133. See Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudenceof
Federalism After Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341, 380 (discussing the ability of state
governments to protect human rights); Michael H. Shuman, Going Local: Devolution
for Progressives, Nation, Oct. 12, 1998, at 11, 15 (observing that devolution "open[s]
up politics and governance to those who have long been disenfranchised").
134. See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public
Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 959, 960 (1991)
(discussing the tendency of local communities to cater to special interests).
135. See Edward L. Rubin, The Fundamentality and Irrelevance of Federalism, 13
Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1009, 1014 & n.20 (1997) (stating that on "an empirical basis, it has
often been the national government, not state governments, that has encouraged citizen participation and programmatic experimentation" on welfare issues).
136. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
Colum. L. Rev. 346, 438 (1990) (contending that the "jurisdictional separation of
wealth and need that results from the fragmentation of most metropolitan areas into a
central city surrounded by a multiplicity of suburbs perpetuates interpersonal as well
as interlocal economic and social inequalities").
137. Paul E. Peterson, City Limits 31 (1981). To the contrary, "limits on local government... require that local governments concentrate on developmental as against
redistributive objectives." Id. at 69.
138. See Michael H. Schill & Susan M. Wachter, Housing Market Constraintsand
Spatial Stratification by Income and Race, 6 Housing Pol'y Debate 141, 141-42 (1995)
(discussing housing market constraints and spatial stratification by race and class).
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local communities,' 39 state primacy-not local control-is critical to
the enforcement of a state constitutional welfare right. 4 '
Third, state constitutional welfare provisions establish a principle of
social citizenship that recognizes the community's shared responsibility for the well-being of its members. The 1996 Act assumes that welfare promotes dependence in citizens and prevents them from
developing individual potential.' 4 ' Article XVII, by contrast, regards
economic stability as a precondition of political life, of social inclusion, and of personal dignity.' 42 A state attempting to reform its welfare system should consider new strategies that are adapted to ensure
long term self sufficiency for those who are currently poor. 43 Reform, however, must address present needs in light of economic fact,
not social stereotype, seeking to realize the normative goal of social
citizenship.
139. See, e.g., Martha Derthick, New Towns In-Town: Why a Federal Program
Failed at xv (1972) (discussing the capture of low-income housing funds). A state
mandate for the provision of welfare services is thus warranted from a public choice
perspective, for the ease of local exit options could facilitate middle class defection
from local welfare solutions, leaving the poor locked into towns that lack fiscal capac-

ity to carry out social service delivery. For example, to the extent that welfare reform
will attempt innovative solutions linked to education and jobs training, there is likely

to be a mismatch between local employment supply and the needs of indigent residents; transportation, housing, and education deficits are likely to compound the

problem. These factors, combined with the vulnerability of localities to narrow interest group capture, make the concept of state duty central to a devolutionary
approach.
140. The normative justification for local control of public assistance is far less
weighty than that of local control of public education. Courts have tended to treat

local control of schools as a constitutional or quasi-constitutional imperative, in part
because it is perceived as implicating a parent's right to raise her child. Commenta-

tors increasingly question the basis for this approach. See, eg., Richard Briffault, The
Role of Local Control in Sdzool Finance Reform, 24 Conn. L Rev. 773, 784 (1992)
(questioning the role of local control in state constitutional school finance cases);
Georgette C. Poindexter, Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the Legal City, 145
U. Pa. L. Rev. 607, 663-64 (1997) (arguing that city boundaries are "inapposite to
modem social and economic development"). But see Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and
the Court, in Symposium Issue: Constructing a New Federalism: Jurisdictional Competence and Competition, supra note 4, at 187, 220-21 (emphasizing the importance of
localities in welfare devolution).
141. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Natureof Dependenciesand Welfare "Refonr," 36 Santa Clara L. Rev. 287, 288-94 (1996) (discussing the conception of dependency that informs efforts to reform public assistance).
142. Cf David Abraham, Liberty Without Equality: The Property-Rights Connection in a "Negative Citizenship" Regime, 21 L. & Soc. Inquiry 1, 20-22 (1996) (describing the New Deal concept of social citizenship).
143. Some commentators argue that AFDC-style welfare benefits may no longer be
relevant to dealing with the problems of poverty. For example, Herbert J. Gans maintains that, "what is needed is more drastic: a job-centered economic security program
for all Americans in occupational and related economic difficulties .... " Herbert J.
Gans, The So-Called Underclassand the Future ofAntipoverty Policy, in Myths About
the Powerless: Contesting Social Inequalities 87, 97 (M. Brinton Lykes et al. eds.,
1996) (emphasis in original).
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Finally, state constitutional welfare provisions establish the principle of judicial enforcement, on the view that state courts will work
collaboratively with the other branches of government to elaborate
social and economic rights. I argue elsewhere that judicial review of

state constitutional welfare rights creates important incentives for
state public officials to face up to constitutional goals. 144 These judicially created incentives pose an essential counterweight to the structural tendencies of state legislatures to ignore the needs of
constituents who lack conventional forms of political access.' 45 Moreover, commentators have warned that the 1996 Act encourages the
states to reduce their commitment to the poor because it allows the
states to "reap financial rewards either from cutting benefits levels or
from helping (or forcing) recipients off welfare. 1 1 46 Judicial review
leverages the political strength of groups that lack strong alliances or
electoral power, moving their concerns onto a legislative agenda and
creating political resources for future use. 47 Moreover, by creating
additional opportunities for citizens to participate in political life, judicial review will foster federalist values and allow
policy questions to
48
be discussed within a framework of principle.'
CONCLUSION

This Essay responds to concerns that the process of welfare devolution will leave the poor worse off than they were under the previous
system of federal statutory entitlements. I suggest that state court interpretation of state constitutional welfare rights could provide a significant source of protection for the poor, but only if state courts
develop an independent methodological approach that recognizes the
144. See Hershkoff, supra note 27 (manuscript at 52-57).
145. See Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1277, 1291-93 (1993); cf Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local
Democracy: The Politicsof DeShaney, 1990 Duke L.J. 1078, 1100-07 (recommending
judicial review as a cure for local administrative failure).
146. Craig Volden, Entrusting the States with Welfare Reform, in The New Federalism: Can the States Be Trusted? 65, 92 (John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast eds.,
1997) ("[S]tates will reap financial rewards either from cutting benefit levels or from
helping (or forcing) recipients off welfare."); cf.Paul E. Peterson, The Price of Federalism 126 (1995) (anticipating that under the then proposed welfare reform bill, "the
race to the bottom is almost certain to intensify").
147. See Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics
of Legal Mobilization 277 (1994) (stating that litigation opens up "new ideological
and organizational possibilities for expanding rights and increasing power"); Joseph
L. Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action at xviii (1970)
("[C]ourts can be used to bring important matters to legislative attention, to force
them upon the agendas of reluctant and busy representatives.").
148. See Joel F. Handler, "Constructingthe PoliticalSpectacle": The Interpretation
of Entitlements, Legislation, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 Brook. L.
Rev. 899, 965-74 (1990) (discussing rights as affirmation); Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. Change 535, 538-42 (1987-88) (discussing client-centered mobilization
activities).
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significant differences between state constitutions and the Federal
Constitution. State constitutional welfare provisions, of which Article
XVII of the New York Constitution is illustrative, can be interpreted
in lockstep with federal constitutional law-or they can be interpreted
in a principled manner that reveals the alternative, and even transformative, possibilities that state constitutions present for civil life. 14 9
This Essay contributes to the effort to establish an independent but
principled state constitutional practice by developing the historical
material needed for meaningful interpretive activity.

149. See Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of
the Constitution 10-11 (1996) (stating that "[historical] research can lay an evidentiary
basis for originalist interpretation, but it can also undermine critical assumptions on
which invocations of original meaning depend, and expose the flawed conclusions
they reach").

